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Abstract

This paper draws on the results of an international survey of HE leaders and senior
managers which was supported by the OECD Programme on Institutional
Management of Higher Education (IMHE) and the International Association of
Universities (IAU). It focuses on how HEIs are responding to league tables and
rankings (LTRS), and what impact or influence – positive or perverse – they are
having on institutional behaviour, decision-making and actions. The growing body of
academic research and journalist reportage is referenced to contextualise this
international experience. The paper shows that while HE leaders are concerned about
the impact of rankings, they are also increasingly responsive and reactive to them. In
addition, key stakeholders use rankings to influence their decisions: students use
rankings to ‘shortlist’ university choice, and others make decisions about funding,
sponsorship and employee recruitment. Rankings are also used as a ‘policy
instrument’ to underpin and quicken the pace of HE reform.

Keywords: higher education, globalization, comparative education, competition,
student responses
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Learning to Live with League Tables and Ranking: The Experience of
Institutional Leaders1

The problem with league tables is ‘the way in which institutions are compared with
inappropriate peers…, and…inputs and outputs are treated in an equivalent
manner‘(Turner, 2005, 354)
‘Hospitals, banks, airlines and other public and private institutions serving the public
are compared and ranked, why not universities?’ (Egron-Polak, 2007).

While university league tables and ranking systems (LTRS) have been part of
the US higher education landscape for decades, they have only reached the level of
intense interest, popularity and notoriety around the world since the late 1990s. In
their contemporary form, they are published by, inter alia, government and
accreditation agencies, higher education, research and commercial organizations, and
the popular media, as a consumer information tool (for a comprehensive list, see
Salmi and Saroyan, 2007, 63-64) – aimed primarily at undergraduate students and
their parents – to satisfy a ‘public demand for transparency and information that
institutions and government have not been able to meet on their own’ (Usher and
Savino, 2006, 38; also Berger, 2001, 500-502). As higher education has become
globalised, the focus has shifted to worldwide university rankings, e.g. THES QS
World University Ranking and Shanghai Jiao Tong Academic Ranking of World
Universities (ARWU) – the latter becoming effectively the ‘brand leader’ in the same
way US News and World Report (USNWR) has become the US ‘gold standard’
3

(Ehrenberg, 2001, 1). Today, despite the fact there are over 17,000 HEIs worldwide,
there is a near gladiatorial obsession with the ‘top’ 100 universities as evidenced by
increasing coverage in the popular press and statements by politicians, policy-makers
and other opinion formers.
LTRS are seen to provide a cue to students – who are increasingly
seen/behaving as clients, consumers and customers – regarding the potential monetary
and ‘private benefit’ of university attainment and the occupational/salary premium
they are likely to acquire. They are a cue to employers as to what they can expect
from graduates they may wish to employ, a cue to government and policymakers on
the quality, international standards and economic credibility of their higher education
institutions, and a cue to HEIs to help benchmark performance. Undoubtedly, their
increasing credibility derives from their simplicity and perceived independence from
the higher education sector or individual HEIs.
Consumers of LTRS can be divided into four broad groups: 1) ‘Users of the
System’, including students, parents, employers and government; 2) HEIs trying to
‘Best the System’ by re-presenting/configuring their data in the most favourable way
or otherwise attempting to influence the input metrics, 3) Groups trying to ‘Better the
System’, such as ranking organisations/consortia, governments and supragovernmental organisations, and academics; and 4) ‘Critics of the System’, who
include elements of all the above. Despite shared misgivings about the methodologies
and possible impact, there is growing acceptance and realisation that rankings can and
do ‘serve a useful role’ by highlighting ‘key aspects of academic achievement’
(Altbach, 2006;
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/Number42/p2_Altbach.htm).
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Accordingly, the HE sector is ‘going to have to learn to live with them, or at the very
least how to play the league table game’ (Bowden, 2000, 58).
So, how are HEIs learning to live with league tables and ranking systems? To
date, attention has focused primarily on three main issues of concern: 1) technical and
methodological difficulties concerning the appropriateness of the metrics, the
weightings given to them, and their suitability as proxies for ‘quality’; 2)
comparability of complex institutions with diverse missions in different policy
jurisdictions, and the tendency to present a single definition of university and
academic quality; and 3) usefulness of rankings as consumer information (see
Hazelkorn, 2007; Usher and Savino, 2006; Ehrenberg, 2001; Dill and Soo, 2005;
Marginson, 2007). In recent years, partially because of greater experience and usage,
and also in response to vocal concerns, attention has begun to focus on the questions
of impact and influence: on higher education, higher education institutions,
policymaking, stakeholders and public opinion. A 2001 survey of US college
presidents, conducted by the Association of Governing Boards (AGB), indicated that
76% of university presidents thought USNWR rankings were somewhat/very
important for their institution; 51% had attempted to improve their rankings; 50%
used rankings as internal benchmarks; and 35% announced the results in press
releases or on the web. Only 4% of university presidents had established a task force
or committee to address rankings, while 20% said they ignored them (Levin, 2002, 12,
14-15).
This paper draws on the results of the first international survey of HE leaders
and senior managers looking behind the glare of publicity to better understand what is
happening inside higher education in response to LTRS. Supported by the OECD
Programme on Institutional Management for Higher Education (IMHE) and the
5

International Association of Universities (IAU), the study received views from
institutions in 41 different countries (Hazelkorn, 2006, 2007). Comments drawn from
those responses are presented in italics throughout. There are two main sections to the
paper: Part 1 focuses on how HEIs are responding to LTRS, with particular reference
to impact on students and other stakeholders, institutional activities, strategy,
organisation and management. Part 2 contextualises these experiences, drawing on
academic research and journalistic reportage, the majority from the US which while
unique does have the longest experience of LTRS. The conclusion asks ‘what’s
next?’, and explores what institutional leaders think is the way forward.

How League Tables and Rankings Impact on HEIs and HE: Institutional
Perspectives

‘Our position is clearly the second…University in international rankings’

Despite growing concerns about technical and methodological issues, there is a
strong perception among university leaders that rankings help maintain and build
institutional position and reputation, good students use rankings to ‘shortlist’
university choice, especially at the postgraduate level, and stakeholders use rankings
to influence their own decisions about funding, sponsorship and employee
recruitment. Benefits are seen to flow directly from high ranking. While many
individual countries are developing their own rankings, worldwide rankings have
greater penetration and significance. This is true even for countries which do not have
national rankings. Accordingly, HE presidents and senior leaders are taking the results
of rankings very seriously.
6

Fifty-eight per cent of respondents are unhappy with their current institutional
rank, and 93% and 82% want to improve their national or international position,
respectively. Seventy percent of all respondents want to be in the top 10% nationally,
and 71% want to be in the top 25% internationally. While answers depend on the level
of ‘happiness with their position’, almost 50% of respondents use their institutional
rank for publicity purposes, either in press releases, official presentations and their
website (see examples above). Positive rankings generate ‘better marketing’ and
‘support of public opinion’, while the converse is also true. A low ranking spawns
‘negative publicity due to not being among 500 best world Shanghai-rated’ forcing
HEIs to ‘waste our time on damage limitation’.

Impact on Students and Other Stakeholders
While over 70% of respondents said the primary or original purpose of LTRS
was to provide ‘comparative information’ to students, there is increasing evidence
that consumers now include government, industry and other stakeholders, whose
decisions are influenced by an institution’s reputation (see Table 1). Respondents
believe rankings are a critical factor underpinning and informing institutional
reputation, and that ‘reputation derived from league tables is a critical determinant
for [student] applicants’. While respondents’ views vary in the degree to which they
think students are ‘more attracted to [a] university because of high ranking’, whether
it is ‘at the margins’ only or more widespread, the general consensus is that ‘student
choice is influenced by ranking’. This is especially true for the international students,
‘where status and prestige are considered in decision-making, although students give
too much weight to rankings without knowing the methodology’. Parents use rankings

7

as a ‘benchmark for judging the best university’, and advise their children
accordingly.

TABLE 1

Institutions believe that high rankings can boost their ‘competitive position in
relationship to government’. In turn, government and funding agencies are more
favourably disposed to highly ranked HEIs, as evidenced through their ‘support’ and
‘commitment’, increased ‘funding to promote teaching and research excellence’ or
facilitation of accreditation. Relatedly, governments use rankings to influence and
incentivise institutional behaviour, e.g. including the ‘development contract …to
strengthen the use of performance indicators in the internal budgeting process’.
Research funding agencies use rankings to ‘distribute the money to universities with
better reputation’. High standing both assures and reassures potential sponsors and
benefactors, enabling them to associate their own corporate image with success:
‘Benefactors don’t want to help or be associated with losers, they want their image to
be associated with winners only’. In binary systems, respondents claimed that
benefactors only fund activities or facilities in universities. Employers also respond
positively:

‘degree holders from universities with good reputations have better

chances to get a job’. New doors can be opened because of good rankings: ‘those not
open to us become more receptive’.
High-quality future faculty are also more attracted to highly ranked institutions,
making ‘recruitment easier because of their good reputation’ because ‘success breeds
success’. Organisationally, good rankings have a positive impact on faculty morale,
associated with ‘pride’ and ‘honour’, and on academic behaviour: increasing
8

‘awareness of the importance of publishing high quality research’ and making it
‘easier to induce an improvement with a department head whose rankings have been
declining’. Conversely, however, respondents complained that poor rankings
impacted negatively on morale:

‘Fine professors and programs (sic) are short

changed having to read a ranking based on doubtfully relevant indicators’ while good
staff leave because they are disappointed by the rankings.
Respondents believe there is greater interest shown by potential institutional
partners, e.g. willingness and ease to establish partnerships and collaboration with
industry and other HEIs. High rankings made it ‘easier to present the institution to
partners and funders’ while another said that high ranking provoked ‘more interest
from other institutions’. Over 40% of respondents admitted that peer-benchmarking
was now integral to their own decision-making about whether to enter international
collaboration, academic programmes, research or student exchanges, while 57% said
they thought rankings were influencing the willingness of other HEIs to partner with
them. Respondents said there was pressure to ‘establish contact with reputed
universities’ while many ‘international partners accept only universities above a
certain level in rankings’. Critically, 34% of respondents said rankings were
influencing the willingness of other HEIs to support their institution’s membership of
academic or professional organisations.
Institutional leaders claim they have experienced the benefits of high ranking –
‘we feel an improvement’: recruitment of better students and faculty, additional
funding, accreditation, and external support is easier or much improved. While it is
less clear that support has actually been withdrawn due to lower ranking, positive
benefits are perceived as unlikely to accrue to institutions with poor ranking and poor
rankings contribute to weakening an institution’s position. ‘Recent statistics…weakens
9

[our university] in the ongoing fusion [merger] process in the country’. Another said
there had ‘been negative publicity due to not being among 500 best world Shanghairated’. There is concern that rankings present a ‘simplistic picture’ and perpetrate an
‘arbitrary definition of quality’, which generates and contributes to public confusion
especially ‘if rankings do not reflect the real quality difference’. These problems are
amplified, when in stakeholders’ minds, there appears to be a correlation between
rank and quality.

Impact on Higher Education
At a macro-level, leaders are concerned LTRS are influencing developments in
higher education and policy decision-making. Do LTRS aid transparency and
accountability, and provide useful information to consumers/students and the general
public or are they distorting academic values? Are LTRS helping HEIs set strategic
goals and improve quality or encouraging HEIs to refocus their activities and resource
allocation in order to gain a better rank – to become what is measured?
The overwhelming majority of respondents said LTRS did not provide a full
overview of an institution but tended to favour the strengths of well-established
universities, with an emphasis on research and postgraduate activity. In so doing, they
helped establish a hierarchy which did little to promote or value institutional diversity
or differentiation or represent the complexity of higher education activities. In an era
when governments favour greater market-led competition between HEIs, respondents
did not agree that LTRS encouraged fair competition, primarily because they are open
to ‘distortion, inaccuracies and obscurities.’ On the question of whether rankings
could ‘make or break an HEI’s reputation’, respondents were evenly split.
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On the other hand, HEIs think LTRS force/help institutions to be(come) more
accountable, set strategic planning goals, and provide comparative information to
students, parents and other stakeholders. They provide a methodology – albeit the
quality of the methodology is contested – by which institutions can benchmark their
own performance and that of other institutions. Yet, unlike a classification system –
which categorises or groups institutions according to type/mission – rankings do not
and thus cannot help institutions either identify or align themselves with ‘true peers’
(Hazelkorn, 2007, 103-104).

Institutional (re)Actions
Given the issues described above, how are HEIs responding? The IMHE/IAU
study shows that over 56% of respondents have established a formal internal
mechanism to review institutional rankings and their own institution’s position. Of
this group, 56% said rankings were reviewed by the Vice Chancellor, Rector or
President, 14% by their Governing Authority, 7% each by their Senate or strategic
planning group, and 5% at departmental level. As a result of this process, 63% of
respondents say they have taken strategic, organisational, managerial or academic
actions (see Table 2). While these ‘headings’ arguably overlap, they seek to identify
different types of decision-making undertaken in response to rankings. Interestingly,
only 8% indicated they had not taken any action – which suggests growing impact
over time compared to the aforementioned US 2001 survey.
Institutional leaders confirm they take rankings seriously, embedding them
within their strategic planning processes at all levels of the organisation, including
Governing Authority, Senior Executive and School/College. Depending upon the
institutional strategic objective vis-à-vis their current position, HEIs use ranking
11

metrics to guide their own goals. This may mean setting student and faculty
recruitment targets (e.g. specifying academic entry criteria, making conditions of
appointment/promotion clearer and more transparent, appointing Nobel prize
winners), indicating individual academic performance measurements (e.g. research
activity

and

peer-review

publications,

programme

development),

setting

school/college level targets, and/or continual benchmarking exercises. As one
respondent stated: ‘the improvement of the results has become a target in the contract
between presidency and departments,’ while another confirmed they have ‘developed
a set of internal research output indicators…we do internal benchmarking’.
Some HEIs have restructured departments, invested in their organisation’s
facilities or improved ‘awareness and expertise in the Research and Innovation
Office’. Many HEIs have established an institutional research office to collect data,
monitor their performance, better present their own data in public or other official
realms, and benchmark their peer’s performance. Others have taken a more aggressive
approach, using rankings as a tool to influence not just organisational change but
influence institutional priorities. In this respect, both teaching programmes and
research are mentioned. Respondents spoke of using ranking ‘to drive activities at
university, faculty and campus levels’ and ‘for internal budgeting’.

TABLE 2

Arguably, the above examples indicate that rankings are having the desired
public policy effect by encouraging HEIs to ‘best the system’ – in other words, to
improve their ranking position by influencing the input metrics used by most ranking
organisations. Other HEIs see it differently; they are effectively developing a survival
12

strategy, which involves either consideration of ‘unhelpful merger proposals’ or
spending substantial sums of money to ‘bolster demand in key overseas markets to
counter league tables’. Overall, their emphasis is on restoring internal morale and
public confidence: ’spend time…restoring our damaged feelings’. For many, the focus
is on better marketing and publicity, including the website, to ‘inform [others] about
our strength’ in light of the impact that LTRS are having on the general perception of
the quality of higher education and particular institutions.
HE leaders readily acknowledge that perceptions of the impact – whether
positive or perverse – is dependent upon institutional position and the level of
‘happiness’ with their position. Thus, respondents spoke of:
‘Decent

rankings

may

help

raise/reassure

awareness

of

institution/department/program and help support their activities’.
‘Foreign universities are interested in the fact that we are one of the
three best private universities in our country.’
‘Installation of a privately funded department of real estate
management by a benefactor/sponsor in response to rankings.’
On the other hand, if an institution’s ranking is considered poor, then there is likely to
be an accumulation of negativity:
‘Denial of collaboration because of a bad position in the Shanghai
Ranking.’
‘Local newspapers write that local government should not spend more
money for our university.’
‘Decline in enrolment.’
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What Other Evidence Tells Us about the Impact and Influence of LTRS on HEIs
‘You should hold a degree from a Times top 100 university ranked at no. 33 or
higher’ (Anon)

While there may be a distinction between perception and reality, evidence
suggests the ‘perception’ held by international HEIs has much validity. This section
refers to some of this other evidence from the academic literature and journalistic
reportage in order to contextualise and assess their responses. That evidence concurs
with the institutions’ view that, in addition to students, there is a growing group of
interested stakeholders who refer to and use – in varying but arguably increasing
degrees – the results of LTRS to inform their own decision-making processes. Dichev
(2001, 237) estimates the total audience for the special issue of USNWR is
approximately 11m people. Consumers include a wide ‘non-consumer audience’ who
account for sales of 40% more than the traditional prospective student cohort market.
Comprising ‘state governments who are directly responsible for allocating funding to
public institutions’, alumni who have an interest and may be potential benefactors,
and the voting public, these audiences
have a direct influence on the amount of financial resources allocated to
colleges, and their preferences may be reflected in tuition policy,
admission criteria, the profile of the faculty, and the campus activities of a
college (Zhe Jin & Whalley, 2007, 2).
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Impact on Student Choice
Because rankings were initially conceived and have continued to be
promulgated as a critical source of transparent consumer information for students and
their parents, this has been one of the main areas of contention. There is little doubt
that the attractiveness of rankings is their simple, easy-to-understand format. They
provide a fast, short-hand Q-mark, enabling the user to ‘pre-sort’ a group of HEIs
prior to more in-depth inquiry (Contreras, 2007;
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2007/07/31/contreras). Yet, do rankings
measure what users think they are measuring? Do they provide the kind of
information and indicators which would be most helpful to students and their parents?
Are students using rankings to help inform their decision-making and to what effect?
The evidence to date is limited but trends are apparent.
Rankings are important for the vital and potentially lucrative international
recruitment market, especially for mobile high-achieving postgraduate students and
particular disciplines such as law, medicine and business (Wedlin, 2006; Sauder and
Lancaster, 2006; Berger, 2001). A recent UK study confirmed that 92% of
international students considered UK league tables important/very important to inform
their choice, although the results seemed less conclusive for Australia. (Roberts, 2007,
5, 18-20;
http://www.theknowledgepartnership.com/docsandpdf/leaguetablepressrelease.pdf).
Relatedly, institutional ranking is a decisive factor for students seeking government
sponsorship/scholarship to study abroad; governments use rankings as an indicator of
‘value-for-money’ (Clarke, 2007, 43). According to Salmi and Saroyan (2007, 52),
scholarships in Mongolia and Qatar are restricted to students admitted to highly
ranked international universities.
15

But rankings are also vital for the domestic undergraduate student market. In the
US, rankings are important for high-ability and second-generation students, and
students from Asian backgrounds (Griffith & Rask, 2007; Ehrenberg, 2004; Monks
and Ehrenberg, 1999; McDonagh et al, 1998; Hossler and Foley, 1995, 29). Spies
(1978) argues that above-average students make choices based on non-financial
factors, such as reputation. Students who have the financial ability to pay full fees –
who are effectively free to choose –, and not reliant on government or other grants,
are more likely to attend higher ranked colleges (even by a few places) than grantaided students who appear to be less responsive to rankings. McDonagh et al (1998)
says that while only 40% of US students use newsmagazine rankings, 11% said
rankings were an important factor in their choice. This group may be small, but it is
the vital high achieving group which HEIs and governments are keen to attract.
Research indicates strengthening usage among lower-income groups
(McManus quoted in Roberts, 2007, 18), but elite responsiveness among students and
parents remains most significant (Mahung, 1998). Attendance at the most select
universities and colleges is seen to ‘confer extra economic advantages to students, in
the form of higher early career earnings and higher probabilities of being admitted to
the best graduate and professional schools’, albeit this may be more for ‘under
represented minority students and students from low-income families’ (Ehrenberg,
2004). It also confers indirect benefits, such as connections to ‘elites’ and future
decision-makers, membership of ‘the right’ social and golf clubs and schools, etc.
Accordingly, there is some evidence that students have ‘tried to increase the standing
of their program in satisfaction-based rankings by sending back surprisingly upbeat
surveys’ (Clarke, 2007). In addition to ‘exacerbat[ing] the competition between
institutions for top students…research indicates that applicant behaviour is very much
16

conditioned by rankings’ (Ehrenberg, 2004, 26); slight changes can ‘cause perceptible
ebbs and flows in the number and quality of applicants’ (Dichev, 2001, 238; Sauder
and Lancaster, 2006, 116; ), especially international students (Honan, 1995; Roberts,
2007, 22;
http://www.theknowledgepartnership.com/docsandpdf/leaguetablepressrelease.pdf).),
albeit Schmalbeck (1998) suggests institutional reputation may be resilient to small or
annual changes.
International research, however limited, supports the US experience. Overall,
61% of UK students referred to LTRS before making their choice, and 70%
considered they were important/very important (Roberts, 2007, 20;
http://www.theknowledgepartnership.com/docsandpdf/leaguetablepressrelease.pdf;
see also Rolfe, 2003, 32-33). The Centre for Higher Education Development in
Germany (CHE), which has been operating a student information system for several
years, says 60% of prospective students ‘know rankings and use rankings as one
source of information among others’ (Federkeil, 2007). Students taking professional
focused programmes are more likely to use such information in contrast to students
taking a traditional ‘academic’ programme. Clarke (2007) cites UK, German and New
Zealand experiences that high-achieving students are more likely to use rankings to
inform choice and high ranking leads to increased applications. While there was no
evidence that lower ranked universities lose students, high ranking does have a
positive impact on application numbers. Where a binary system exists, there is some
evidence that ranking is accelerating social selectivity by sector (see Sauder and
Lancaster, 2006, 122-124). For example, Ireland has witnessed strong migration out
of its institute of technology sector in favour of universities as demographics change,
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and competition escalates the reputation race (Fitzgerald, 2006; Clancy, 2001, 56-57
and Table 17).
Most attention has focused generically on student choice and behaviour. There
is, however, a need to distinguish between undergraduate and postgraduate students.
The latter is likely to be more responsive to worldwide rankings given their maturity,
career focus and capacity for mobility, in addition to increasing national and
institutional anxiety to recruit these lucrative students who can also shore up national
research and economic development strategies (Kallio, 2001).

Impact on Recruitment, Marketing and Reputation
University administrators are ‘most engaged and obsessively implicated’
(Keller, 2007) with the collection of data used for rankings, and their aftermath. They
are effectively ‘caught between not wanting to place public emphasis on their
ranking…and privately trying to avoid slipping’ (Griffith and Rask, 2007). Both
reactions are understandable given mounting evidence that rankings do impact on
student numbers, quality of applicants, and institutional reputation, and that ‘changes
in rank have a significant influence on the applications and enrolment decisions of
students…’ (Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999, 10; see Wedlin, 2006; Roberts, 2007). But
is it the objective to increase student numbers or only ‘recruit students who will be
“assets” in terms of maintaining and enhancing their position in the rankings’?
(Clarke, 2007, 38)
Monks and Ehrenberg (1999, 10; also Ehrenberg, 2001, 2) produce evidence of
a direct correlation between high ranking and more applications. An institution whose
rank improves can accept a smaller percentage of its applicants and thereby increase
its selectivity – a metric used by USNWR and The Sunday Times. On the other hand,
18

‘a less favourable rank leads an institution to accept a greater percentage of its
applicants, [leading to] a smaller percentage of its admitted applicants [who]
matriculate, and the resulting entering class is of lower quality, as measured by its
average SAT [college entry] scores’ – and the circles repeats itself, leading to a
downward spiral in terms of ranking position. They suggest that ‘the growing
popularity and influence of these rankings may also lead the institution to try to
influence them’. Because the selectivity index is a key metric in the US, institutions
have sought to influence the number of applicants it receives while still retaining the
same number of available places. This may have the knock-on effect of ‘creating a
new second tier of elite institutions’ benefitting from the ‘overflow’ and obsession
with ‘elite’ institutions (Finder, 2007; Samuelson, 2006). It may also force HEIs to
abandon distinctive missions – such as access programmes – that are not measured in
rankings (Espeland and Sauder, 2007, 15).
Private institutions are better able to respond to ranking pressure, given their
ability to ‘adjust net tuition in response to changes in USNWR rank’ (Meredith, 2004,
460). They are better able to use mechanisms, such as financial aid and investments,
to influence ‘student input’ metrics (Brewer, Gates and Goldman, 2002). They may
also admit students on probationary or part-time basis so their (relatively) lower
entrance scores will not be included in official data returns or discourage others
(Ehrenberg, 2001, 7). Or, they may step-up their publicity and marketing efforts to
encourage more students to apply. Other methods include using merit aid to ‘purchase
talent’ or invest in ‘image-enhancing facelifts’, such as dormitories, fiber optic
networks and sports facilities.
Too many institutions now spend their resources aggressively recruiting
students with high SAT or ACT scores and other conventional markets
19

of achievement that correlate strongly with socioeconomic status. In turn,
at many institutions those choices skew the allocation of financial aid
from students with the great need to those with the most offers of
admission (Lovett, 2005).
Some of these actions are admirable but the effect may be to reduce the ‘resources
available for other activities, including those designed to recruit and retain students
from traditionally underrepresented groups’ (Clarke, 2007, 38; see also Stake, 2006;
Meredith, 2004).
While European HEIs have not heretofore had a history of such investment,
there are increasing reports that these ‘added-value’ facilities and sport scholarships
are a critical factor in institutional marketing and strategic development, and national
and international recruitment. Selectivity indices have also not been a significant
element of other national or worldwide rankings, especially in Europe where equity
and open recruitment has tended to be the norm. Nonetheless, even in systems, such
as in Ireland, where student admissions are effectively ‘blind’ to subjective factors,
there are suggestions HEIs have endeavoured to influence the process.

Impact on Other Stakeholders
There

appears

to

be

less

hard

evidence

on

how

stakeholders

–

government/policymakers, funding agencies, employers, and sponsors – are,
positively or perversely, being influenced by LTRS, but again a pattern is emerging
(see Meredith, 2004, 457-458). Employers have long recognised the advantages of
recruitment from specified institutions; the ‘milk run’ is a date in many large
corporations’ diary for graduate recruitment. US accounts claim law firms regularly
20

use USNWR rankings to ‘determine the threshold for interviews’ (Espeland and
Sauder, 2007, 19). A recent study by the University of Sussex for the Higher
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) says employers rely strongly on
institutional reputation gained via rankings in the Times Higher Education
Supplement or implicit knowledge: 25% of graduate recruiters interviewed ‘cited
league tables as their main source of information about quality and standards’
(University

of

Sussex,

2006,

87,

80,

also

87-92;

http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/rdreports/2006/rd20_06/):
It tends to be knowledge that we’ve gained over the years but I guess in terms of
hard data we use The Times Higher Education…
We would look at The Sunday Times league table. And then just, I think,
general opinion,…
While graduate success in the job market does reflect ‘traditional status hierarchies’,
there is evidence that graduates of particular universities do especially well (Clarke,
2007). Employers use league tables as a method of pre-selection, targeting graduates
of the same top 10 or 20 universities: ‘… as long as we keep taking graduates from
those universities and those graduates come into the business and perform
exceptionally well, there is no reason to change’ (University of Sussex, 2006, 87).
Governments are similarly influenced, and acutely conscious of how rankings
can be used to drive institutional behaviour (Baly, 2007). Ministers and policy
directors refer to their institutions’ ‘world class’ excellence as a statement of national
pride and attractive selling-point to encourage inward investment. Not surprisingly,
the Malaysian government felt compelled to establish a Royal Commission of Inquiry
to investigate why the rankings of its two top universities fell by almost 100 places
within a year (Salmi and Saroyan, 2007, 40; see also recent reaction in Australia,
21

http://blogs.smh.com.au/newsblog/archives/016441.html). Ironically, poor rankings
can also incentivise a government to spend more financial resources on poorer ranked
institutions (Zhe Jin and Whalley, 2007, 22). Spiewak (quoted in van Raan, 2007, 94)
reports that Deutsche Telekom used rankings to help select the location for
professorial chairs. While formal rankings may not be used, private philanthropy in
Ireland has gone, with minor exceptions, only to the university sector. Monks and
Ehrenberg (1999, 6) similarly notes the correlation between high rankings and/or an
improvement in position and increases in endowment per student.
Governing Boards and alumni are not immune either. Writing on the ‘uses and
abuses’ of rankings, Levin (2002, 1) remarks:
For many trustees, alumni, parents, and others, a high ranking means
bragging rights on the golf course or grocery line – an ephemeral pleasure
similar to when the football or basketball team wins a national ranking.
His study (2002, 12, 15) shows that 75% of university presidents believe their boards
think they need to pay attention to USNWR rankings ‘whether it likes it or not’; 36%
felt rankings were important to attract students; 34% felt rankings were helpful for
benchmarking; 33% said they misled students and their families; and 20% said they
were worthwhile. Not surprisingly, 68% of boards did discuss rankings, with 71%
doing so for half an hour or more. Honan (1995) reports that alumni from Hamilton
College, NY, anxiously queried ‘what was wrong after it fell out of the top 25 national
liberal arts colleges in the USNWR rankings.’
These examples also illustrate how public opinion can be a vital agenda-setting
media through which reputation is both reified and reinforced – even amongst those
who themselves may not have been HE graduates (see Hossler, 1998, 164). Zhe Jin
and Whalley (2007, 19) argue that because ‘state funding and tuition prices at public
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colleges are topics frequently discussed in many types of media, including
newspapers, magazines, TV and radio’, the public is increasingly sensitized to the
issues’, in addition to which rankings ‘provide a focal point for the public to pay
attention to higher education.’

Impact on Institutional Behaviour
HEIs are learning to 1) reap the benefits, 2) adjust/alter their institutional
behavior in order to better reap the benefits or 2) try to ignore all the fuss – often
experiencing all three forms of ‘reactivity’ in reverse order.
When

rankings

were

introduced

most

administrators

dismissed

them…Over time, law schools learned that rankings were fateful, that
people made important decisions using rankings, and schools began to
invest heavily in improving rankings. This reinforced rankings’ impact and
legitimacy… (Espeland and Sauder, 2007, 23-24).
Monks and Ehrenberg (1999; see also Wedlin, 2006) outline a wide range of measures
taken by HEIs, ‘at all places in the selectivity game’ (Ehrenberg, 2001, 4), to
influence their rank, ‘correcting their data in a way that leads to an improvement in
their ranking, or by devoting resources to activities related to improving their rank
that do not directly enhance educational quality’. Senior HE ‘administrators consider
rankings when they define goals, assess progress, evaluate peers, admit students,
recruit faculty, distribute scholarships, conduct placement surveys, adopt new
programs and create budget’. Whichever action they choose, ‘rankings are always in
the back of everybody’s head’ (Espeland and Sauder, 2007, 11). In many instances,
consultants are hired to provide guidance.
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There may be little public acknowledgement by HEIs that they have purposely
designed a strategy to improve their rankings, but there is growing evidence to the
contrary. Levin (2002, 6-7) recounts the ‘case study’ of Virginia Commonwealth
University whose board adopted a goal to move from Tier 3 to Tier 2, and ‘to develop
a plan to make it happen’. Its institutional research office spent six months gathering
data, and a vice president for institutional outreach was hired and put in charge of
admissions, marketing and communications. Nine strategies were adopted including
improving academic programmes, developing a marketing plan, enhancing
publications and the website, increasing the proportion of faculty with terminal
degrees, and increasing the proportion of full-time faculty. Similar to a recent offer by
the board of Arizona State University, ‘for every year VCU is ranked in Tier 2, the
board has promised him a $25,000 bonus’ (Chronicle of Higher Education, 25 May
2007; East Valley Tribune, 18 March 2007).
A memorandum to the board of a US highly-ranked doctoral university detailed
particular strategies to be adopted in order to achieve single digit ranking: these
include 1) spend more money per student; 2) double the annual private fund-raising;
3) increase public funding; and 4) increase the endowment. According to Levin,
university presidents have highlighted specific metrics for improvement, inter alia:
88% identified retention rates; 84% alumni-giving; 75% graduation rates; 71% entry
scores; 63% faculty compensation; and 31% student-faculty ratio. More than 25% of
presidents sought to improve educational expenditure, by effecting greater selectivity,
increasing faculty salaries, creating new and better programmes, improving funding
and use of resources, changing the hiring or promotional procedures and improving
marketing. While only 7% mentioned improving research capacity, others recorded a
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shift in resources from teaching to research, marketing or merit scholarships
(Espeland and Sauder, 2007, 25-27).

Impact on Higher Education
All commentators acknowledge that rankings must now be considered part of the
fabric of higher education. For many, the difficulties with rankings are, as Altbach
(2006;
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/Number42/p2_Altbach.htm) states,
not with the principle but with its practice. Because of the close correlation between
rankings and reputation (see Espeland and Sauder, 2007, 14; Roberts, 2007, 4;
University of Sussex, 2006, 119), HEIs are looking more and more closely and
strategically on how to improve their position. For many, this means focusing on the
critical input indicators – but at what cost?
For example, focusing on student selectivity could undermine other educational
and national objectives, such as widening access. ‘Miles College in Alabama and
Jackson State U in Mississippi both score low in USNWR rankings in part because
they serve many financially needy students, who score lower on standardized tests
than their more privileged peers do, and because the two institutions spend relatively
little on each student.’ However, if a different set of measurements is used, such as the
US National Survey of Student Engagement, both score well above national average
in several key categories, e.g. frequency of outside-the-classroom discussions, and
promptness of feedback to students (Chronicle of Higher Education, 22 September
2006). Because there is little genuine movement year to year (Dichev, 2001) and
‘…certain institutions or types of institutions…rise to the top regardless of the
specific indicators and weightings’ (Usher and Savino, 2007, 32), to realistically
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effect any change requires vast financial investment. In this climate, public HEIs,
especially those dependent on the public purse, have an impossible task competing.
‘Existing input metrics favor (sic) private institutions, which are already wellendowed, over public ones’ (Farrell and van der Werf, 2007).
Rankings inflate the academic ‘arms race’ locking HEIs into a continual ‘quest
for ever increasing resources’ (Ehrenberg, 2004, 26), reinforcing the ‘effects of
market-based and competitive forces’ (Clarke, 2007, 36), ‘intensif[ying] competitive
pressures’ and creating a ‘global market’ which places a ‘growing emphasis on
institutional stratification and research concentration’ and establishes a worldwide
norm for a ‘good university’ (Marginson, 2007, 132, 136). Universities which do not
meet the criteria or do not have ‘brand recognition’ are effectively devalued or
ignored (Lovett, 2005; Machung, 1998, 13). This is further promulgated by the fact
that US community colleges, which comprise 45% of US undergraduate students, are
not included in the USNWR rankings, while the CHE rankings list universities and
fachhochschulen/universities of applied sciences separately
(http://www.daad.de/deutschland/hochschulen/hochschulranking/06543.en.html).
Others argue it is not all doom and gloom. Salmi and Saroyan (2007, 53) say
rankings can be used in a constructive way, forming a vital part of institutional
strategic planning and development.
If rankings can prompt a retrospective analysis of institutional
performance, leading to setting goals to support institutional and national
visions, then they can be considered as having a positive impact towards
improvement.
In a similar view, Samuelson (2007) argues that there is an important leveling process
going on:
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the old elite…suffer because they can’t accommodate everyone who’s
qualified…More good students and faculty must go elsewhere….The new
elite have gained more than the old have slipped. Ivy League schools, for
example still dominate Rhodes scholarships, but less so. In the 1960s, their
students won 39 percent; in this decade, that share is 27 per cent.
Academic improvements and campus developments are occurring because HEIs are
using rankings to benchmark their performance and facilities, and engage in continued
quality assurance.

What’s Next?
League tables and rankings have gained popularity because they (appear to)
fulfil particular purposes and needs. While initially many concerns were easily
ignored or shrugged off with reference to either the individual institution’s (poor)
score or broader policy objectives (e.g. accountability, transparency, benchmarking
and strategic planning), there is now increasing realisation and evidence that LTRS
are having an (unintentional) impact and influence on higher education institutions
and higher education broadly. It is clear that they are equated in the minds of students,
their parents and other key stakeholders with quality, and are now a significant factor
shaping institutional reputation. A high rank is perceived as better, and to be placed in
the top 100 worldwide is considered a strategic ambition for many governments and
institutions. In this respect, there is increasing evidence that rankings are being used
by governments as a policy instrument, a tool for speeding up reform of higher
education, the creation of an elite group in different countries (e.g. Russia and
Germany) similar to the UK Russell Group, forcing/encouraging mergers, etc. Some
of this emanates from confusing rankings with evaluation and accreditation. Indeed,
27

the speed of reform is likely to quicken as governments believe it will lead to more
competitive and better (more highly ranked) HEIs. On the other hand, institutional
leaders and governing authorities are using rankings as a management tool, to enforce
change and internal restructuring, resource allocation, changes in academic practice,
etc.
The extent to which all these changes can be rated as either positive or perverse
is still debatable, but it is clear that rankings are a manifestation of the already
competitive global market in which higher education operates, and are being used and
perceived as such. Rankings have placed a new premium on status and elite
institutions, reinforcing reputation and vice-versa, with a strong bias towards longestablished and well-endowed institutions. Those who can afford to do well in this
marketplace will benefit, while others may find their current position eroding or just
plainly ignored. In policy and funding regimes which resource HEIs wholly or
disproportionately through the public purse, there is a growing public intolerance for
increases in public expenditure. Those institutions are coming under greater pressure
to reduce costs and improve efficiencies, often translated into reducing unit cost. In
these circumstances, it will be difficult to positively impact on the student-faculty
ratio – one of the key input metrics – thus forcing greater institutional and sectoral
differentiation according to social selectivity/stratification. The formation of
worldwide networks and consortia of top elite HEIs (e.g. Universitas 21, Coimbra
Group, League of European Research Universities [LERU], Worldwide Universities
Network [WUN], and International Alliance of Research Universities [IARU]) is also
likely to further inflate the gap between elite and mass education as institutions use
the rankings as a guide for partnership and collaboration, and governments form
closer alliances with these cartels. Despite calls for greater inter-institutional
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collaboration, elite institutions are unlikely to see benefit in working with or helping
‘lesser’ institutions.
A world-class university is $1b-$1.5b-a-year operation, plus an additional
$500m if there is a medical school. This would require many HEIs increasing their
overall funding by at least 40% (Usher, 2006,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20061030.URCworldclassp2
8/BNStory/univreport06/home; Sadlak and Liu, 2007, 20). Few societies or (public)
institutions can afford this level of investment, without sacrificing other social and
economic objectives, such as widening access, institutional diversity, community
partnerships, cross-institutional collaboration and resource sharing, and knowledge
transfer (see Ehrenberg, 2001, 17-20). Developing countries and new HEIs are most
vulnerable in this environment – as the kinds of metrics which propel institutions to
the top are far behind achievement; thus, the wedge between elite and mass education
is likely to be replicated on a global scale. The Matthew Effect2 will become
increasingly obvious, as HE is arguably restructured for the benefit of elite highachieving students and their institutions.
What’s next? Because of various factors identified above, different countries,
regions, organisations and institutional groups are understandably endeavouring to
establish their own counter-ranking systems. While this illustrates a positive
determination to become engaged in the debate and process, this balkanisation of
rankings is counter-productive because worldwide rankings have established
credibility with the major stakeholders that needs an appropriate response to be
sustainable. How should quality be defined and measured, by whom and for what
purpose? According to Levin (2002, 15), 77% of US presidents said better criteria
should be developed to measure educational outcomes, and USNWR should stop
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measuring how much an institution spends or measuring reputation. Additional
metrics might include accomplishments of graduates, student satisfaction,
postgraduate training, and graduate employment rates.
Similar to the US study, IMHE/IAU respondents did not suggest any radical
departure from existing metrics (Hazelkorn, 2007). Asked to chose from a range of
commonly used indicators, respondents gave low ‘marks’ only to some, each of which
is explicable by the fact that they are relevant to or beneficial to relatively few or
specialist HEIs: alumni or private giving, investment, Nobel or similar prizes, and
exhibitions and performances. Those metrics which received the majority of support
(respondents could indicate all that apply) were teaching quality, student-faculty ratio,
graduate employment, research (including publications, citations and income), PhD
students, finance, student life, selectivity, mission and the library. Rankings should be
conducted by independent research organisations or accreditation agencies, or by nongovernmental or international organisations – not by media organisations. Ideally,
respondents favour institutional or publicly available data or that which has been
gathered by questionnaires. Less than 20% favour peer review, which compares
favourably with the US study which also found strong dislike for reputational
questions. Despite criticism about the difficulty comparing whole institutions with
different missions, 30% of respondents favour institutional reviews rather than
programme or departmental level (21% respectively). Ultimately, the objective should
be to enable student choice, provide accountability and enhance quality while giving a
‘fair and unbiased picture of the strengths and weaknesses of a university’.
This paper set out to understand how LTRS are impacting on and influencing
institutional behaviour and decision-making. The IMHE/IAU study provides the first
wide-angle view as to what is happening, and how institutional leaders are
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responding. Their experience – as the ‘foot soldiers’ of this new HE world – is
replicated throughout the literature, hence the gap between their perception and the
reality is actually quite narrow. While most research on the impact and influence of
LTRS is drawn from the US, there is much to learn from it. Indeed, the international
experience differs only in detail. It is also clear that while universities, policymakers
and stakeholders criticise and lampoon league tables and rankings, few can afford to
ignore them – and most have incorporated them in some fashion into their strategic
thinking if not their planning. It is, however, worth considering and reflecting on how
an arguably innocuous consumer concept, propagated

by various media

organisations, has been transformed into a policy instrument with wide ranging
consequences for higher education.

Notes
1

An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Higher Education in the 21st

Century – Diversity of Missions conference (Dublin, 2007) and 3rd Meeting of the
International Ranking Expert Group (Shanghai, 2007). Special thanks are extended to
Richard Yelland, OECD/IMHE, and Eva Egron-Polak, IAU, who supported the
research, and Amanda Moynihan, my research assistant.
2

The ‘Matthew Effect’ is based on a line in St. Matthew's Gospel that says, ‘For unto

every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that
hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath’ (Matthew 25:29). This line has
often been summarized as: ‘The rich get richer, and the poor get poorer.’
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TABLE 1
PERCEPTION OF HOW LTRS IMPACT ON KEY STAKEHOLDERS
Examples
Benefactors/Sponsorships • ‘It totally depends on the rank’
• ‘I think all will tend to go for the best in the rank’
• ‘They feel reassured supporting us’
• ‘To date only universities have benefitted’
• ‘Benefactors don’t want to be associated with
losers, they want their image to be associated with
winners only’
Collaborators/Partners
• ‘Willingness to join common programme’
• ‘Good for reputation at international level’
Current/Future Faculty
• ‘Increases awareness about the importance of
publishing high quality research’
• ‘Easier to induce improvement with the department
head whose rankings are declining’
• ‘Stimulus to compare research output and teaching
quality’
• ‘Recruitment will be easier because of good
reputation’
• ‘Make standards for appointment/promotion more
clear and transparent’
Employers
• ‘Degree holders from universities with good
reputation have better chances to get a job (and vice
versa)’
• ‘Employers get the signal of quality’
• ‘They feel reassured. Those not open to us become
more receptive’
Government
• ‘Repetition of negative reputation’
• ‘Accreditation is easier’
• ‘Less pretext for obstacles, more doors opened’
• ‘May believe simplistic picture’
• ‘Local government is inclined to spend additional
money for an excellent university’
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• ‘More students are willing to come to the campus’
• ‘High profile students usually apply to high profile
universities’
• ‘Particularly in the international market where
status and prestige are considered in decisionmaking…’
• ‘Pride (actively shown e.g. in public forums)’
• ‘Advise their children to go to highly ranked
universities’
Source: Adapted from Hazelkorn, 2007
Students/Parents
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TABLE 2
ACTIONS TAKEN BY HEIS IN RESPONSE TO LTRS
Examples
Strategic

Organisational

• ‘Indicators underlying rankings are explicit part of target
agreements between rector and faculties’
• ‘Write a new strategy’/‘Develop strategic plan’
• ‘Aim to be in top 100 internationally’
• ‘Have become part of a SWOT analysis’
• ‘We have charged a person with managing some of the key
indicators…We do not orient our strategy to please the rankings, but
do consider the meaningful measures they provide’
• ‘A position in the controlling department of the administration has
been established to deal with indicator improvements and ranking’
• ‘Reorganisation of department structure’
• ‘Regular observation of rankings and methods; supervision of the
data delivery to ranking projects; continuous observation of
indicators of other universities’
• ‘Renewed emphasis on the accuracy/amount of data gathered and
rd

shared with 3 parties’
Management
• ‘Improvement of the results has become a target in the contract
between presidency and departments’
• ‘Development of better management (budgetary) tools for
supporting fields of excellent research’
• ‘Formation of a task group to review and report on rankings’
Academic
• ‘Deans and faculties are increasingly sensitized for ranking
results and underlying indicators’
• ‘Results of rankings are regarded in the construction of the new
study structure’
• ‘Strategy for improving structure of teaching and output (number
of degrees)’
• ‘Formulation of explicit demands for the productivity of the
individual researcher’
Source: Adapted from Hazelkorn, 2007
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